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Construction Organizing: 
A Case Study of Success 
Brian Condit, Tom Davis, Jeff Grabelsky, 
and Fred Kotler 
This chapter examines how IBEW Local 611, based in Albuquerque, New 
Mexico, reversed its decline and between 1988 and 1994 reemerged as a 
dominant force in its jurisdiction. What the local did, how it did it, and 
what other building trade unions can learn from 611's success are the cen-
tral points of the discussion. 
IBEW Local 6H's experience is instructive for several reasons. Its situa-
tion during the 1970s was typical of most crafts unions, and its first re-
sponse to a crisis that gripped unionized construction in the 1980s was 
similar to that of many locals within and outside the IBEW: it made conces-
sions and developed market recovery programs. What was remarkable 
about Local 611 was the way its leadership, at the urging of the interna-
tional, embraced workforce organizing, developed a dynamic strategy, and 
mobilized the membership to support and activate it. 
Staff organizers analyzed market data and developed this comprehensive 
strategy by examining the strengths and weaknesses of various players in 
the market. They creatively used a wide range of tactics, including salting, 
stripping, market recovery, and legal action, applying different degrees and 
kinds of pressure, depending on the circumstances, to different contractors. 
Moreover, they developed broad membership support for the local's or-
ganizing program through COMET; once the local had this support, it 
could identify and mobilize activists, fund full-time organizers, and, quite 
critically, "open the door" by welcoming new members and revising long-
standing internal procedures and practices that were impeding workforce 
0rganizing. The local increased its membership by more than four hundred, 
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or about 35 percent, from 1988 to 1995, and organized DKD Electric, the 
largest open-shop contractor, as well as fifteen other nonunion firms, in its 
jurisdiction. Further, according to internal documents from 1988 to 1994, 
the local dramatically diminished the threat from some particularly trouble-
some contractors, such as the Gardner-Zemke Company. 
Background on Local 611 
Local 611 's jurisdiction is immense. It covers more than 120,000 square 
miles—most of the state of New Mexico—and encompasses about 
1.7 million people, including approximately twenty-five hundred licensed 
electricians. 
Through the 1960s and 1970s, the local maintained a strong presence in 
the construction market by relying primarily on large industrial projects 
that employed large numbers of crafts workers. During the 1970s, the union 
estimated that its share of the construction market was about 45 percent, 
on the strength of relatively high levels of unionization in industrial con-
struction (internal documents 1988-94). 
The demand for skilled electricians during the 1970s exceeded the local's 
labor supply so that "travelers" from other jurisdictions, as well as non-
union "permit workers," were invited to work on the area's mega-projects. 
When the large industrial jobs began to wind down in the 1980s, Local 611 
reacted as did many building trades locals throughout the country: the 
travelers were sent home and the permit workers were returned to the 
jurisdiction's nonunion labor pool with new skills in industrial construction 
and a taste for union wages and conditions but resentful because they had 
been denied union membership. 
Members of Local 611 who had enjoyed many years of uninterrupted em-
ployment saw work opportunities dwindle. The local soon reported a decline 
of almost 50 percent in its "man hours" worked. Many members facing the 
prospects of prolonged unemployment in the union sector traveled to the few 
remaining unionized jurisdictions across the United States, left the IBEW tem-
porarily (with their "tickets in their shoes"), left permanently to work non-
union, or deserted the industry altogether (internal documents 1988-94). 
Like the reactions of its counterparts throughout the industry, the early 
response by Local 61 l's leadership to the decline in employment was con-
cessionary: job targeting and market recovery programs. Ferdie Martinez, 
Local 61 l's business manager from 1981 to 1987, negotiated a memoran-
dum of understanding with signatory employers that gave him the authority 
to grant a concessionary wage on targeted projects. This agreement was 
drawn up with the hope of securing additional work for union contractors 
and jobs for unemployed members. 
Unlike some building trade unions, Local 611 resisted across-the-board 
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concessions in its collective bargaining agreements. But the concessionary 
wages authorized by the business manager engendered resentment among 
members employed at lower rates. Between 1986 and 1992, Local 611's 
market recovery program dispensed cash grants to signatory contractors in 
excess of $1 million. This enabled the local to keep select union contractors 
signatory, but it did not lead to signing new contractors or regaining market 
share. In fact, in many jurisdictions throughout the building trades, absent 
an effective organizing effort, market recovery plans contributed to a down-
ward spiral in industry standards (Local 611 internal document, 1988-94; 
interview, T. Davis 1996). 
In 1988, almost every major electrical construction project in Local 611's 
jurisdiction was being done by one of two principal nonunion contractors: 
DKD Electric or its chief rival, Gardner-Zemke, a former signatory em-
ployer that went open shop in 1986 (Local 611 internal documents 1988-
94). That same year, Local 611, along with Locals 570, 640, 602, and 583 
—all part of the IBEW's southwestern district—participated in an elec-
tion campaign to organize Gardner-Zemke. Although the IBEW won in 
Tucson and Phoenix, it lost in Albuquerque, Amarillo, and El Paso. But 
even in units where majorities were won, negotiations never led to signed 
agreements. 
Local 611 organizer Brian Condit soon recognized the limitation of Board 
elections in the construction industry, a lesson many building trade unionists 
still do not understand. Victory in a certification election meant that the 
union had won the right to bargain, a right it already enjoyed under section 
8(f) of the National Labor Relations Act. 
Winning the right to bargain is, as typified by the IBEW's post-election 
experience, hardly equal to winning a contract. For Condit, building the 
power to win a contract was more important than reaffirming the union's 
legal right to bargain. As he noted: "The fundamental source of union 
power in construction is control of the skilled labor supply. We believed 
that if we organized the workers, the contractors would come. That belief 
drove our organizing program from the start" (interview, 1996). 
Although the immediate outcome of the certification election was disap-
pointing, it represented an important step in union outreach to unrepre-
sented workers and afforded valuable lessons. "We learned how to make 
contact with nonunion workers," notes Condit, "[and] discovered they were 
a lot like us. We learned about workers' rights under the Act, but we also 
learned not to confuse justice with the law" (interview, 1996). 
Reaching Out to Unrepresented Workers 
Following the election setback, local organizers pursued other approaches. 
Key among these was salting—sending union members to work for non-
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union employers for the express purpose of organizing. An important ele-
ment of a nonelection strategy, salting revives one of the tactics used by 
founders of the building trade unions a century ago who supported them-
selves by working in their trade while they organized their coworkers. 
Through salting and direct recruitment of unrepresented workers, early 
organizers built a loose monopoly of an area's skilled labor pool. Contrac-
tors signed contracts to gain access to the union-controlled labor supply, 
and unions enacted internal rules prohibiting members from working for 
nonsignatory contractors. This strategy provided unions with effective le-
verage to expand the contractor base and maintain market dominance. 
Local union bylaws, including those of the IBEW, continued this prohibition 
long past the time when many locals had high rates of union density. The 
IBEW recognized and advised that it was therefore necessary for locals to 
pass special salting resolutions enabling job-site organizing to proceed with-
out compromising the integrity of local bylaws. This was an important 
policy adaptation at the international level to vastly changed circumstances 
within the industry. 
Local 611's salting resolution, which it passed in 1988, was one of the 
first internal policy changes aimed at facilitating organizing. Staff organizers 
provided key leadership by becoming the first salts, and soon rank and filers 
followed suit. The union's salts were instrumental in identifying the most 
skilled nonunion electricians and recruiting them into the local, thereby 
"stripping" open-shop contractors of their most skilled labor. 
Recruiting new members into an IBEW local took political courage in 
1988. When Brian Condit initiated his first recruit, a former union member 
and Gardner-Zemke employee named Rick Howe, a near riot erupted at 
the local union meeting and police had to be called to restore order (inter-
views, Condit 1996 and Davis 1996). As was the case in virtually every 
IBEW jurisdiction, the ranks of Local 611 opposed organizing new mem-
bers because they feared a growing membership would increase unemploy-
ment and insecurity. "I just kept organizing," asserts Condit. "I was going 
to do it or we were going to die." In the long-run, Condit won out. In the 
short-run, however, his boss, business manager Dub Baker, was voted out 
of office. Although he retained his position as local president, Condit was 
subsequently replaced as organizer by Ben Sandoval, who kept the spirit 
alive. "I felt good about organizing," he remembers. "We continued organiz-
ing good hands who couldn't get in when the local was a country club in 
the late seventies and early eighties" (interviews, Condit 1996 and Sandoval 
1996). 
The kind of rank-and-file resistance witnessed in Local 611 and through-
out the Brotherhood threatened to derail the IBEW's organizing program. 
The international union implemented COMET, its membership education 
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training program, in 1990 to overcome that problem (Grabelsky 1995). 
"COMET dramatically changed attitudes," reports Chris Frentzel, Local 
611 current business manager. 
Before COMET was started, organizing was regarded as a politically 
volatile issue only a few leaders were willing to support; after only 150 
Local 611 members had been "COMETized," organizing new members 
became a more viable enterprise. Membership support grew, so that by 
1992 the rank and file voted for a new assessment to enable the local to 
hire another full-time organizer and Tom Davis joined the staff in June of 
that year. "That was not an administration motion," explains Davis. "It 
came from the heart of the membership." As we shall see, by 1994, the 
deployment of COMET-trained activists proved to be decisive in success-
fully organizing DKD Electric (interview, Davis 1996; Grabelsky 1995). 
After Tom Davis came on staff, he spent several months collecting data on 
Local 6H's jurisdiction. He found that small and medium-sized nonunion 
employers were thriving because they had access to an abundant supply of 
about three hundred electricians who routinely worked for $10 to $12 an 
hour less than the union wage package. Union employers operating in the 
same commercial market were struggling to compete with these lower-cost 
contractors. Davis concluded that if Local 611 could recruit a significant 
percentage of the unrepresented electricians, he could cripple the ability of 
nonunion employers to operate open shop while simultaneously enabling 
signatory contractors with five to ten employees to expand their operations. 
Local 611 then began identifying and communicating with unrepresented 
electricians in a systematic and ongoing way. Given the transient nature of 
the workforce in construction, this can be a difficult challenge, especially 
when a local has a vast geographic jurisdiction. But New Mexico's state 
licensing law facilitated Local 611's efforts to contact nonunion electricians. 
The local organizers began publishing the Electrical Workers of N.M. 
Newsletter, without revealing the IBEWs direct involvement. The newslet-
ter addressed issues of concern to all working electricians and was distrib-
uted to nonunion workers by mail. The response to the newsletter was 
promising. A typical letter to the editor from 1992 read: "It's about time! 
. . . Electricians need to be heard in reference to the conditions [under] 
which we are forced to work. Your newsletter is a breath of fresh air to 
myself (sic) and the others on our crew." 
Davis and other organizers often found that open-shop electricians, espe-
cially the "best hands," were reluctant to leave their current employers to 
join a union in which employment prospects were uncertain. This problem 
was exacerbated by the local's referral procedure, which placed newly orga-
nized workers on a lower-priority referral list than current members. So the 
referral rules were adjusted to allow new members who had worked for any 
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contractor in the jurisdiction for one of the last three years to be included 
in the top-priority referral category. This represented another significant 
internal change to support organizing. 
Once the referral procedures were altered, Local 611 recruited nonunion 
electricians more effectively. Each new recruit who passed the local's jour-
ney-level examination was inducted into the local and placed in the top 
priority for future referral to a union contractor, but, in the meantime, he 
remained with his current employer as a salt to gather information and 
enlist other electricians. 
An improving economic climate aided the local's organizing activities. As 
construction picked up, union members on Book I were referred out to jobs, 
and small signatories began to call for additional electricians. On the one 
hand, many of these calls were for jobs old-time union members shunned: 
service assignments and projects at targeted market recovery rates of only 
$14.35 an hour, well below union scale. On the other hand, the newly 
organized members who had remained with their nonunion employers wait-
ing for the hiring hall to clear were pleased to obtain union employment. 
The local then began strategically placing these electricians with signa-
tory contractors, who were delighted with the new members' skills and 
productivity. 
As the local replenished its labor pool with newly organized electricians, 
signatory contractors who had been reluctant to expand their operations 
became increasingly confident as they successfully bid on work in the ex-
panding commercial market. Their success heightened the demand for 
union electricians, which in turn facilitated the local's ongoing efforts to 
recruit more new members. 
Through stripping, Local 611 brought in as members about fifty of two 
hundred to three hundred electricians working in open shops—enough to 
disrupt nonunion business significantly. Following their basic credo—"Top-
down efforts begin after the employer feels our bottom-up pressure"— 
organizers approached those contractors most severely hurt by the local's 
stripping activities and persuaded many of them to sign collective bar-
gaining agreements. In doing so, these contractors regained access to a 
skilled labor pool, which they required to continue operations. 
The growing number of newly unionized electricians and newly organized 
employers produced the perception that employment prospects were more 
favorable in the unionized sector of the industry. That perception helped 
generate momentum just as a boom in industrial construction blessed Local 
611's jurisdiction. The local's success in constricting the open-shop labor 
market created a favorable environment to pressure industrial contractors, 
and IBEW organizers turned their attention to vital targets, including DKD 
Electric (interview, Davis 1996). 
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Organizing DKD Electric 
DKD Electric opened for business in 1978 and within ten years established 
itself as one of the key players in electrical construction, earning about $5 
million gross annually. On a 1988 DKD project employing sixty electricians, 
a significant but undetermined number were union members. DKD presi-
dent Dee Dennis speculates that "some may have been salts. But others were 
just looking to support their family. . . . The union guys were more qualified 
than the guys off the street. That was the first place we noticed how poorly 
trained and skilled the open-shop labor market was." That the local had 
systematically stripped as much as one-fourth of the most qualified non-
union electricians had clearly affected DKD's plans and capacity to expand 
(interview, 1996). 
DKD retained a relatively stable workforce of about seventy electricians. 
That number was sufficient until MyCorp Corp.,1 a computer chip giant, 
commenced an enormous expansion of its New Mexico operations. As one 
of the successful bidders, DKD looked forward to doing some of MyCorp's 
$1.5 billion construction project. 
In early 1993, when MyCorp began its new construction, IBEW Local 
611 was poised to organize as never before. It had stripped a significant 
portion of the skilled open-shop labor pool. It had trained several hundred 
COMET activists. It had acquired the organizational skills and strategic 
acumen to tackle a major target. The local just needed to get a foothold on 
the MyCorp site. 
Hughes Electric was the only union signatory to be awarded any part of 
the project. DKD won the lion's share of the electrical work at MyCorp, 
and other open-shop electrical contractors were assigned smaller portions. 
When the local sent nearly one hundred members to work for Hughes 
Electric on the MyCorp project, it instructed them to do two things: per-
form their work in an exemplary fashion to demonstrate the quality and 
character of the union labor pool and build a good relationship with DKD 
employees. This second instruction represented a dramatic departure from 
recent experience on "mixed" job sites in the construction industry, where 
the relationships between union and nonunion workers have often been 
acrimonious. The union activists sent to Hughes Electric understood and 
appreciated their instructions because of the COMET program (interview, 
Davis 1996). 
At the same time that Local 611's activists commenced their "bottom-up" 
efforts among DKD employees, Ben Sandoval and Tom Davis initiated their 
"top-down" strategy by visiting DKD's office. Dee Dennis, president of 
1. To maintain confidentiality, a fictitious name is used here and throughout. 
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DKD, remembers the meeting and appreciated their approach. "They were 
straightforward with us," Dennis recalls, "When they came to us, we knew 
they had a recruiting plan for DKD. They said, 'We like how you treat your 
people and manage your business' " (interviews, Davis 1996 and Dennis 
1996). 
That meeting came at an auspicious time for DKD. The demand for labor 
on the My Corp project greatly exceeded the capacity of DKD's eighty-
employee workforce and the contractor had gone into a feverish hiring 
mode, employing a full-time personnel manager to locate and recruit electri-
cians, spending $2,500 a week advertising across the country, and running 
ads in the local papers every day for almost a year. It was not a pleasant 
time for Dennis. "We had contractors on the same site competing for the 
same manpower, and we got into a bidding war," he remembers. "One 
contractor offered $200 for electricians just to sign up. Wages jumped from 
$11.50 to $14.50 an hour with full benefits!" Out of necessity, DKD em-
ployed lesser-skilled electricians at higher wages than Dennis would have 
countenanced just a year before. "We lost the advantage that operating 
open shop gives a contractor who can pay lesser-skilled workers less wages" 
(interview, 1996). 
The new circumstances created turmoil in DKD's ordinarily smoothly run 
business. DKD crew leaders were confounded by the challenge of meeting 
production schedules with an underqualified workforce. That was about 
the time Local 611 organizers came into the picture. Dennis met with Davis 
and Condit over a period of several months to address how the IBEW 
could solve DKD's need for skilled labor (interview, Dennis 1996). The 
extraordinary demand for skilled labor and the impact of Local 611's drive 
to recruit area electricians combined to make Dennis especially receptive to 
the union's top-down pitch. 
At the same time that IBEW Local 611 was making inroads with DKD, 
Gardner-Zemke's workforce was gradually reduced from nearly three hun-
dred electricians in 1991 to about fifty journey-level electricians by 1994 
through salting, stripping, strikes, and unfair labor practice charges. By 
contrast, DKD instructed the salts on its payroll to avoid confrontational 
and disruptive concerted activities so that DKD's steady employees would 
not be alienated from the union. 
As DKD and other newly organized contractors expanded their share of 
the construction market, the threat of nonunion competition from employ-
ers like Gardner-Zemke was dramatically diminished. "Fellow open-shop 
contractors were being hammered by direct union organizing," concedes 
Dennis. "We were aware of that." (interview, 1996). 
The union's claim of having an available pool of highly qualified workers 
was reaffirmed by the obvious productivity of the Local 611 members and 
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IBEW travelers Dennis employed. This led Dennis to believe that it would 
be "a good business decision . . . [to] arrange an accommodation with the 
IBEW." On Friday, March 21, 1994, Dennis left the following message for 
Chris Frentzel, Local 611's business manager: "Tell him to get his ass over 
here with a pen" (interviews, Dennis 1996 and Davis 1996). 
During contract negotiations, Local 611 also had to make certain accom-
modations to DKD. A six-month trial period was granted before DKD 
would become signatory to the union's standard agreement. Projects already 
bid would be "grandfathered" in so that DKD would not be unfairly saddled 
with higher labor costs on jobs estimated at open-shop rates. Revealing 
the effectiveness of 611's organizing strategy, when agreement was finally 
reached, Dennis shook hands with the union's negotiators and asked, "Can 
you send me five electricians tomorrow?" (interviews, Dennis 1996 and 
Davis 1996). 
The signing of DKD required adjustments in the way the union handled 
its affairs. One question was how to deal with the sudden influx of workers 
whose skill levels varied widely. In response, the Joint Apprenticeship and 
Training Committee (JATC) adjusted its program to meet the needs of 
organizing. This included developing placement tests, setting up special 
classes, and training new instructors to deal with the large numbers of 
new journey-level and apprentice members. DKD had about twenty in-
dentured apprentices who had been enrolled in the state-approved Inde-
pendent Electrical Contractors' four-year apprenticeship program. Local 
611's JATC reviewed these apprentices' records and slotted them into the 
IBEW's five-year apprenticeship program, asking most to move back a 
year. 
DKD, like other open-shop contractors, also employed unindentured 
helpers. The use of such semi-skilled workers presents a competitive advan-
tage to nonunion employers, reflects the ways in which electrical construc-
tion has been deskilled in the last twenty-five years, and posed another 
administrative challenge to the local. The JATC agreed to admit ten of 
DKD's twenty-two best helpers into the local's rigorous apprenticeship 
training program. Four subsequently dropped out. 
Becoming a union signatory has had a dramatic impact on DKD. On the 
MyCorp project, Dee Dennis gained access to the skilled labor supply his 
business required. His company now employs more than five hundred union 
electricians. And according to Dennis, "We wouldn't be a $25 to $30 mil-
lion contractor and we wouldn't be in markets we're in today without 
having become a union contractor. The manpower just wasn't there in the 
open shop." The down side for DKD is that it can no longer compete in 
markets that are still dominated by open shops. Dennis would welcome 
unionization of those markets (interview, 1996). 
318 CONDIT, DAVIS, GRABELSKY, and KOTLER 
Lessons Learned f rom 611 's Experiences 
The circumstances presented and the resources available to IBEW 611 are 
similar to those of locals throughout the construction industry. The crucial 
factor in Local 61 l's success is leadership skill. That skill was exhibited in 
the following ways: 
• The local's leaders retained confidence in the membership to under-
stand and rally behind the goals, strategy, and tactics of workforce 
organizing. 
• Staff organizers provided role models for member-activists by being 
among the first to salt nonunion jobs. 
• Organizers didn't get discouraged but learned and applied valuable 
lessons from unsuccessful NLRB elections. 
• Organizers stayed focused on recapturing control of the skilled labor 
pool by organizing workers into the union. It was clearly understood 
that the measure of organizing effectiveness and success is not just 
signing contractors to collective bargaining agreements but, more im-
portant, increasing membership and market share. Membership in-
creased by more than four hundred members, or 35 percent, between 
1988 and 1995. 
• A market-wide strategy was developed after thoughtful analysis of the 
strengths and weaknesses of key players within the jurisdiction. The 
strategy avoided targeting individual contractors in isolation from oth-
ers and considered the relationships among various players in the 
market. 
• Tactics served that strategy because they were applied dynamically. 
Although the local used a wide range of tactics, including stripping, 
salting, work site concerted activities, unfair labor practice charges, 
and top-down pressure, it never embraced any single tactic inflexibly. 
It carefully selected the right tools for each target. 
• Having significantly dried up the skilled labor supply during leaner 
times through its solid organizing, the local was able to take full advan-
tage of improved economic circumstances when they arose. 
IBEW Local 61 l's leaders, most fundamentally, understand power: how 
to build it and how to use it. The ultimate aim for all building trade unions 
is to achieve sufficient power to determine the terms and conditions of 
every construction worker in his respective trade and jurisdiction. With 
such power, unions can negotiate better and better contracts, winning for 
members growing prosperity, a rising standard of living, a better quality of 
life, and more democratic control over their work lives. With such power, 
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unions can organize a growing contractor base, expanding employment 
opportunities and enhancing job security. And with such power, unions can 
stabilize the industry and tame its most destructive competitive tendencies. 
The obstacles to building such power are not insurmountable. With per-
sistence, courage, and a lot of hard work, the leaders and members of IBEW 
Local 611 have demonstrated how this power can be achieved. 
